Consider the following quotation from a textbook on early modern Europe:
“Drawing on the traditions of Plato and Calvin, he [Rousseau] defined freedom as obedience to the law. In his case, the law to be obeyed was that created by the general will. In a society with virtuous customs and morals in which citizens have adequate information on important issues, the concept of the general will is normally equivalent to the will of a majority of voting citizens. Democratic participation in decision making would bind the individual citizen to the community. Rousseau believed the general will, thus understood, must always be right and that to obey the general will is to be free. This argument led him to the notorious conclusion that under certain circumstances some people must be forced to be free. Rousseau’s politics thus constituted a justification for radical direct democracy and for collective action against individual citizens.”*
A couple of things here: firstly, Rousseau was crazy. Really, I don’t think that is an exaggeration. But brilliant as well. So much of what he said went up against the accepted assumptions of his time that he is one of those rare birds that manages to break out of the supposedly all-encompassing thought structure of any given period.
That being said, a lot of that was for the worse, refuting some of the best lessons of the Enlightenment. As soon as we get going with the above quote, we run into trouble. Anyone who bases any of their political thought on Calvin immediately gives causes for suspicion. Calvinism, one of the most morally stringent forms of Protestantism and also the one that gives the least in return, in terms of psychological and theological comfort, does not sound like a practical place to start when figuring out a political system that needs to deal with dirty, human interest. ** Needless to say, our modern democracy here in California hardly qualifies as having “virtuous customs” in the way Rousseau imagined them (which would include, by the by, a total separation of the spheres between men and women). Thus, direct democracy as we practice it today would look like a farce to Rousseau, since he would probably take issue with everything, from the inequalities built into the voting system to the fact that we like to vote ourselves tax cuts. (Individual profit as motive is no good here, you see; nor is large amounts of private property.)
That being said, I can’t help wondering what those conservatives who think that something like Prop 8 is constitutionally and/or philosophically sound would think when confronted with the implications of this quote. Because really, what Prop 8 did was exactly what Rousseau intended the “general will” to be empowered to do: enable “collective action against individual citizens.” When you argue that the will of the people has passed Prop 8, and therefore Prop 8 is right, it would be well to inform yourself not only of all the times the “will of the people” has voted to do things much more horrific than stripping citizens of legal equality but, what the philosophical implications are in such a statement.
Personally, I’d rather have activist judges any day over Rousseau’s inescapable, omniscient “general will,” closed to reconsideration, reason, or exception.
[Perhaps more on this latter: the “tyranny of the majority” problem can also be well addressed by a look at Madison.]
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* The Western Heritage, Donald Kagan, 569.
** Not for all people, obviously, otherwise there would be no attraction to him; but personally, reveling in the thought of my total inability to comprehend any moral order because the order of God is so beyond my comprehension and thus, giving up on the only tool I have, reason, as a mode of finding answers to the most basic questions of human existence? Not my cup of tea, and, I would argue, while perhaps theologically attractive to some, not a very useful place to start when coming up with political constitutions.
Of course, a lot of people would point to groups like the Puritans and place the origins of much modern democracy in covenant theology of Calvinist origin; fair enough. But that’s not what Rousseau is taking out of Calvin, is it? At least certainly not a select, covenanted communion with a Christian God that has religious tests for membership, considering he was a Deist. And furthermore, I would argue that while the covenant theology/origins of democracy obviously has some validity, especially in America, that it had just as much and probably more to do with British political culture operating in the backwaters of America where representative assemblies and local modes of government needed to be created somehow, in any case, and in New England this was often facilitated by religious organization.